This paper analyzes the worst-case efficiency ratio of falsename-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. False-nameproofness generalizes strategy-proofness by assuming that a bidd...
Atsushi Iwasaki, Vincent Conitzer, Yoshifusa Omori...
Games are used to evaluate and advance Multiagent and Artificial Intelligence techniques. Most of these games are deterministic with perfect information (e.g. Chess and Checkers)....
Social laws have proved to be a powerful and theoretically elegant framework for coordination in multi-agent systems. Most existing models of social laws assume that a designer is...
We study a more powerful variant of false-name manipulation in Internet auctions: an agent can submit multiple false-name bids, but then, once the allocation and payments have bee...
Many applications in multiagent learning are essentially convex optimization problems in which agents have only limited communication and partial information about the function be...
Renato L. G. Cavalcante, Alex Rogers, Nicholas R. ...