We present a new approach to representing coalitional games based on rules that describe the marginal contributions of the agents. This representation scheme captures characterist...
We study the dynamics of the Naming Game [Baronchelli et al., (2006) J. Stat. Mech.: Theory Exp. P06014] in empirical social networks. This stylized agentbased model captures essen...
This paper presents a new lower bound of 2:414d= p d on the maximal number of Nash equilibria in d d bimatrix games, a central concept in game theory. The proof uses an equivalent ...
In this essay, I examine differences between individual and social play and, in particular, the differences between individual and social play within digital media forms designed ...
Abstract. We study the decision theory of a maximally risk-averse investor — one whose objective, in the face of stochastic uncertainties, is to minimize the probability of ever ...
Noam Berger, Nevin Kapur, Leonard J. Schulman, Vij...