Abstract This paper describes a generic compiler, called plp, for translating ordered logic programs into standard logic programs under the answer set semantics. In an ordered logi...
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
We consider a multiagent resource allocation domain where the marginal production of each resource is diminishing. A set of identical, self-interested agents requires access to sh...
This paper shows how to formally characterize language learning in a finite parameter space as a Markov structure, hnportant new language learning results follow directly: explici...
We provide tight information-theoretic lower bounds for the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions. In this problem, the goal is to partition m items among k bidde...
Vahab S. Mirrokni, Michael Schapira, Jan Vondr&aac...