We investigate the design of iterative, limited-precision mechanisms for single-good auctions with dominant strategy equilibria. Our aim is to design mechanisms that minimize the ...
Auctions are useful mechanisms for allocating items (goods, tasks, resources, etc.) in multiagent systems. The bulk of auction theory assumes that the bidders know their own valua...
In this paper, we show how the dynamics of Q-learning can be visualized and analyzed from a perspective of Evolutionary Dynamics (ED). More specifically, we show how ED can be use...
Our work is motivated by the problem of managing data on storage devices, typically a set of disks. Such storage servers are used as web servers or multimedia servers, for handling...
Leana Golubchik, Samir Khuller, Yoo Ah Kim, Svetla...
In 2-player non-zero-sum games, Nash equilibria capture the options for rational behavior if each player attempts to maximize her payoff. In contrast to classical game theory, we ...
Krishnendu Chatterjee, Thomas A. Henzinger, Marcin...