We study the question of how to easily recognize whether a social unction f from an abstract type space to a set of outcomes is truthful, i.e. implementable by a truthful mechanis...
For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG mech...
We provide tight information-theoretic lower bounds for the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions. In this problem, the goal is to partition m items among k bidde...
Vahab S. Mirrokni, Michael Schapira, Jan Vondr&aac...
Search personalization has been pursued in many ways, in order to provide better result rankings and better overall search experience to individual users [5]. However, blindly app...
Julia Luxenburger, Shady Elbassuoni, Gerhard Weiku...
This paper takes one step towards addressing the question of how activity mediated by shared representations--notations that are manipulated by more than one person during a collab...