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» Strategic Voting and Strategic Candidacy
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ATAL
2006
Springer
15 years 9 months ago
Strategic voting when aggregating partially ordered preferences
Preferences of a single agent are often partially ordered. For example, it may be hard to compare a novel with a biography. In such a situation, the agent may want the novel and t...
Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi, Kristen Brent ...
CORR
2002
Springer
108views Education» more  CORR 2002»
15 years 5 months ago
Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness
Preference elicitation is a central problem in AI, and has received significant attention in single-agent settings. It is also a key problem in multiagent systems, but has receive...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
JAIR
2008
117views more  JAIR 2008»
15 years 6 months ago
Complexity of Strategic Behavior in Multi-Winner Elections
Although recent years have seen a surge of interest in the computational aspects of social choice, no specific attention has previously been devoted to elections with multiple win...
Reshef Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosens...
CORR
2011
Springer
148views Education» more  CORR 2011»
14 years 9 months ago
Dominating Manipulations in Voting with Partial Information
We consider manipulation problems when the manipulator only has partial information about the votes of the nonmanipulators. Such partial information is described by an information...
Vincent Conitzer, Toby Walsh, Lirong Xia
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
128views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2010»
15 years 6 months ago
Equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions
In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group of manipulators jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain candidate elected, while the ...
Yvo Desmedt, Edith Elkind