We discuss the design of the Intermediary Agent's brain, the control module of an embodied conversational virtual peer in a simulation game aimed at providing learning experi...
A strong equilibrium (Aumann 1959) is a pure Nash equilibrium which is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We define the strong price of anarchy to be the ratio of the worst c...
In this paper, we propose a novel general framework for analysing competing double auction markets that vie for traders, who then need to choose which market to go to. Based on th...
Bing Shi, Enrico H. Gerding, Perukrishnen Vyteling...
We consider four different game-theoretic approaches to describe the formation of social networks under mutual consent and costly communication. First, we consider Jackson-Wolins...
The Shapley Value is arguably the most important normative solution concept in coalitional games. One of its applications is in the domain of networks, where the Shapley Value is u...
Karthik V. Aadithya, Balaraman Ravindran, Tomasz P...