A communication channel from an honest sender A to an honest receiver B can be described as a system with three interfaces labeled A, B, and E (the adversary), respectively, where...
The information flow property of Non-Interference was recently relaxed into Abstract NonInterference (ANI), a weakened version where attackers can only observe properties of data,...
We present the first type and effect system for proving authenticity properties of security protocols based on asymmetric cryptography. The most significant new features of our ...
We enforce information flow policies in programs that run at multiple locations, with diverse levels of security. We build a compiler from a small imperative language with locali...
Runtime enforcement is a common mechanism for ensuring that program executions adhere to constraints specified by a security policy. It is based on two simple ideas: the enforceme...
Nataliia Bielova, Fabio Massacci, Andrea Michelett...