We review the close relationship between abstract machines for (call-by-name or call-by-value) λ-calculi (extended with Felleisen’s C) and sequent calculus, reintroducing on the...
Auction mechanism design is a subfield of game theory dedicated to manipulating the rules of an auction so as to achieve specific goals. The complexity of the dynamics of auctions...
Jinzhong Niu, Kai Cai, Simon Parsons, Elizabeth Sk...
At Wellesley College very rarely do the Fine Art and Computer Science faculty cross paths. That was the case until two years ago when we taught an experimental course that brought...
Recent results have established that a variety of voting rules are computationally hard to manipulate in the worst-case; this arguably provides some guarantee of resistance to man...
In an election held in a noisy environment, agents may unintentionally perturb the outcome by communicating faulty preferences. We investigate this setting by introducing a theore...
Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Gal A....