Encouraging voters to truthfully reveal their preferences in an election has long been an important issue. Previous studies have shown that some voting protocols are hard to manip...
We consider PAC learning of simple cooperative games, in which the coalitions are partitioned into "winning" and "losing" coalitions. We analyze the complexity...
Scoring rules are a broad and concisely-representable class of voting rules which includes, for example, Plurality and Borda. Our main result asserts that the class of scoring rul...
Ariel D. Procaccia, Aviv Zohar, Jeffrey S. Rosensc...
Recent work by Procaccia, Rosenschein and Zohar [14] established some results regarding the complexity of manipulation and control in elections with multiple winners, such as elec...
Reshef Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosens...
We consider collusion in multi-unit auctions where the allocation and payments are determined using the VCG mechanism. We show how collusion can increase the utility of the collud...