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FOCS
2005
IEEE
15 years 11 months ago
Beyond VCG: Frugality of Truthful Mechanisms
We study truthful mechanisms for auctions in which the auctioneer is trying to hire a team of agents to perform a complex task, and paying them for their work. As common in the ļ¬...
Anna R. Karlin, David Kempe, Tami Tamir
AAAI
2007
15 years 8 months ago
Partial Revelation Automated Mechanism Design
In most mechanism design settings, optimal general-purpose mechanisms are not known. Thus the automated design of mechanisms tailored to specific instances of a decision scenario...
Nathanael Hyafil, Craig Boutilier
APPROX
2009
Springer
142views Algorithms» more  APPROX 2009»
16 years 19 days ago
Truthful Mechanisms via Greedy Iterative Packing
An important research thread in algorithmic game theory studies the design of efficient truthful mechanisms that approximate the optimal social welfare. A fundamental question is ...
Chandra Chekuri, Iftah Gamzu
SIGECOM
2006
ACM
107views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2006»
16 years 33 min ago
Empirical mechanism design: methods, with application to a supply-chain scenario
Our proposed methods employ learning and search techniques to estimate outcome features of interest as a function of mechanism parameter settings. We illustrate our approach with ...
Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Christopher Kiekintveld, Mic...
UAI
2004
15 years 7 months ago
Regret Minimizing Equilibria and Mechanisms for Games with Strict Type Uncertainty
Mechanism design has found considerable application to the construction of agent-interaction protocols. In the standard setting, the type (e.g., utility function) of an agent is n...
Nathanael Hyafil, Craig Boutilier