We discuss the design of multi-dimensional tender and auction mechanisms that combine Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and auction theory. The mechanisms select an agent to perform...
For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG mech...
We investigate the problem of allocating items (private goods) among competing agents in a setting that is both prior-free and paymentfree. Specifically, we focus on allocating mu...
We present PaDIS Emulator, a fully automated platform to evaluate CDN-ISP collaboration for better content delivery, traffic engineering, and cost reduction. The PaDIS Emulator e...
Ingmar Poese, Benjamin Frank, Simon Knight, Niklas...
We study a multi-unit auction with multiple bidders, each of whom has a private valuation and a budget. The truthful mechanisms of such an auction are characterized, in the sense ...
Christian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, Nicole Immorl...