We study sequential auctions for private value objects and unit-demand bidders using second-price sealed-bid rules. We analyze this scenario from the seller’s perspective and con...
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions (ICA) have been getting increasing attention in computer science and economics, as they provide an efficient solution to resource allocation prob...
Alexander Pikovsky, Pasha Shabalin, Martin Bichler
The paper describes the architecture of Brown University’s agent, Botticelli, a finalist in the 2003 Trading Agent Competition in Supply Chain Management (TAC SCM). In TAC SCM,...
Michael Benisch, Amy R. Greenwald, Ioanna Grypari,...
We present the design of a banner advertising auction which is considerably more expressive than current designs. We describe a general model of expressive ad contracts/bidding an...
Craig Boutilier, David C. Parkes, Tuomas Sandholm,...
Market mechanisms play a central role in AI as a coordination tool in multiagent systems and as an application area for algorithm design. Mechanisms where buyers are directly clea...