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SAGT
2010
Springer
167views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2010»
15 years 4 months ago
A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a (Rational) Convex Program for It
Recent results showing PPAD-completeness of the problem of computing an equilibrium for Fisher’s market model under additively separable, piecewise-linear, concave utilities (pl...
Gagan Goel, Vijay V. Vazirani
SAGT
2010
Springer
191views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2010»
15 years 4 months ago
Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting
We investigate the computational aspects of safe manipulation, a new model of coalitional manipulation that was recently put forward by Slinko and White [11]. In this model, a pot...
Noam Hazon, Edith Elkind
ATAL
2009
Springer
16 years 1 months ago
The price of democracy in coalition formation
Whenever rational agents form coalitions to execute tasks, doing so via a decentralized negotiation process—while more robust and democratic—may lead to a loss of efficiency ...
Georgios Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind, Maria Polukar...
APSEC
2007
IEEE
16 years 22 days ago
Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Group Ticket Allocation in Software Maintenance Services
A customer reported problem (or Trouble Ticket) in software maintenance is typically solved by one or more maintenance engineers. The decision of allocating the ticket to one or m...
Karthik Subbian, Ramakrishnan Kannan, Raghav Kumar...
SAGT
2010
Springer
160views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2010»
15 years 4 months ago
How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard?
The PPAD-completeness of Nash equilibrium computation is taken as evidence that the problem is computationally hard in the worst case. This evidence is necessarily rather weak, in ...
Paul W. Goldberg