We investigate the design of iterative, limited-precision mechanisms for single-good auctions with dominant strategy equilibria. Our aim is to design mechanisms that minimize the ...
In: Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference on Cooperative Information Systems (CoopIS-03), pp. 93–109, Springer-Verlag LNCS Series. c 2003 by Springer-Verlag. We a...
With the recent advances in communications technologies and decentralization of work practices, there has been an increase in distributed, remote, computerized work environments. I...
Digital information economies require information goods producers to learn how to position themselves within a potentially vast product space. Further, the topography of this spac...
Christopher H. Brooks, Robert S. Gazzale, Jeffrey ...
Making it easier to design interactions between agents and humans is essential for realizing multi-agent simulations of social phenomena such as group dynamics. To realize large-s...