Restricting the preferences of the agents by assuming that their utility functions linearly depend on a payment allows for the positive results of the Vickrey auction and the Vick...
Paul Harrenstein, Mathijs de Weerdt, Vincent Conit...
We derive optimal bidding strategies for a global bidding agent that participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We first consider a mo...
Enrico H. Gerding, Rajdeep K. Dash, David C. K. Yu...
We present a method of grounded word learning that is powerful enough to learn the meanings of first and second person pronouns. The model uses the understood words in an utteran...
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a key issue in multiagent systems. Due to its universality, voting has a central role among preference aggregation mechanisms. Votin...
We study a limited-supply online auction problem, in which an auctioneer has k goods to sell and bidders arrive and depart dynamically. We suppose that agent valuations are drawn ...
Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Da...