We address the problem of auditing an election when precincts may have different sizes. Prior work in this field has emphasized the simpler case when all precincts have the same s...
We present mechanisms, architectures, and an implementation addressing challenges with mobile opportunistic commerce centering on markets and mechanisms that support the procureme...
Many important problems in multiagent systems can be seen as resource allocation problems. For such problems, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, in...
In a class of games known as Stackelberg games, one agent (the leader) must commit to a strategy that can be observed by the other agent (the follower or adversary) before the adv...
Praveen Paruchuri, Jonathan P. Pearce, Janusz Mare...
We address the learning of trust based on past observations and context information. We argue that from the truster's point of view trust is best expressed as one of several ...