Introduced by Micali, Rabin and Kilian (MRK), the basic primitive of zero-knowledge sets (ZKS) allows a prover to commit to a secret set S so as to be able to prove statements such...
An important aspect of mechanism design in social choice protocols and multiagent systems is to discourage insincere and manipulative behaviour. We examine the computational compl...
Predictable allocations of security resources such as police officers, canine units, or checkpoints are vulnerable to exploitation by attackers. Recent work has applied game-theo...
Christopher Kiekintveld, Manish Jain, Jason Tsai, ...
—The main contribution of this paper arises from the development of a new framework, which has its inspiration in the mechanics of human navigation, for solving the problem of Si...
We investigate deterministically simulating (i.e., solving the membership problem for) nondeterministic finite automata (NFA), relying solely on the NFA’s resources (states and ...