While traditional mechanism design typically assumes isomorphism between the agents’ type- and action spaces, in many situations the agents face strict restrictions on their act...
: A generalization of subjective expected utility is presented in which the primitives are a finite set of states of the world, a finite set of strategies available to the decision...
: Other work has shown that adaptive learning can be highly successful in developing programs which are able to play games at a level similar to human players and, in some cases, e...
We analyze a sequential game between a Gambler and a Casino. The Gambler allocates bets from a limited budget over a fixed menu of gambling events that are offered at equal time i...
We present the logic CTL.STIT, which is the join of the logic CTL with a multi-agent strategic stit-logic variant. CTL.STIT subsumes ATL, and adds expressivity to it that we claim...